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Abstract: In this essay, I examine Michel Foucault’s political contrast between the theological 
domains of the pastoral and the mystical, in order to note his focus on how necessity and 
providence are founding and legitimizing concepts of the State. Through this process            
I develop an analysis of how Foucault, in his critique of the historical uses of theology as       
a tool of pastoral power, actually points toward another form of political theology than Carl 
Schmitt’s. My contention is that we begin to see another “type” of political theology appear 
in the writings of Giorgio Agamben, who follows Christian traditions much more closely 
than Foucault. The re-formulation of political theology within Agamben’s work, I argue, has 
tremendous significance for the field as a whole and is much in need of further elaboration,    
a task toward which this essay only points. 
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In this essay, I want to examine Michel Foucault’s political contrast between the theological 
domains of the pastoral and the mystical, the manner in which he links the pastoral, his 
conceptualization of governmentality and his development of the care of the self (e.g. as 
demonstrated in the examination of conscience, among other religious practices), as well      
as the historical tensions between pastoral power and asceticism. In looking at these various 
historical phenomena, I try to move closer toward his focus on how necessity and providence 
are founding and legitimizing concepts of the State, a move which enables us to consider the 
relationship between sedition and heresy in an entirely new light. The historical contexts with 
which such an analysis deals – here following Foucault’s genealogical accounts closely – tell 
us a good deal about how the western world has developed an operative political theology (in 
the Schmittian sense); yet they tell us little about how theology might develop its own 
political self-awareness which would allow it to perform its tasks otherwise than as history 
has often dictated. It is this theological strand of possibility that I want to uncover through an 
examination of what follows. 
 What I want to develop through this analysis, more specifically, is a platform for 
understanding how Foucault, in his critique of the historical uses of theology as a tool of 
pastoral power, actually points toward another form of political theology than the one that 
Carl Schmitt had once envisioned, a field that perhaps has not yet been fully developed 
beyond its limited theological-scholarly guild1. My contention in this essay is that we begin to 
see another “type” of political theology appear – one that has yet to be more clearly identified 
and discussed – in the writings of Giorgio Agamben. The re-formulation of political theology 
within his work, I argue, has tremendous significance for the field as a whole and is much in 
need of further elaboration, a work toward which this essay only points. 
* 
To begin with, Michel Foucault, in his lectures from 1977–1978, which were titled Security, 
Territory, Population, outlines the basic coordinates of the state and its foundational logic, 
which, we find, is inherently grounded in a pseudo-theological foundation. Just as theological 
argumentation, for centuries, had defined God as a being that existed out of “necessity”, so 
too does Foucault isolate this essential condition of political foundations – their origins in 
“necessity”, as all states will appear to have been grounded – as its own inherent theological 
                                               
1  The field of  “political theology”, theologically speaking, is rather eclectic and broad-ranging; from Carl 
Schmitt’s early use of  the term to Ernst H. Kantorowicz’s The King’s Two Bodies (Kantorowicz 1957), the term 
has often been rooted in political-theoretical discussions. In terms of  theological discourse, it has been 
developed in the works of  Johann Baptist Metz, Jürgen Moltmann, and, even more recently, Stanley Hauerwas 
and John Howard Yoder.  For an introductory account, see Scott and Cavanaugh 2006. In its more recent 
philosophical manifestations, see, among others, Critchley 2012, Crockett 2011, and Žižek, Santner, and 
Reinhard 2005. 
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justification. Quite simply, and as will be the case historically for many theologies, “[p]olitics 
is concerned with necessity”, from the state’s origins to its sovereign decisions (Foucault 
2007, 263). In general, politics bases its rationale for existence, as well as its operational ethos, 
on the necessity of taking action, and its “greatest” leaders, we might add, are typically those 
who engage in decisive and seemingly “necessary” action.  
 It is in this sense that we might come to understand the 20th century German 
political theorist Carl Schmitt’s determination of politics as inextricably concerned with         
a form of decisionism that establishes its foundations, and that implies a certain theological 
sense of predestination or necessity. According to Schmitt, the sovereign is the figure who 
makes the final and governing decisions, an action that serves to legitimate their role in 
society (Schmitt 2005, 5). The exercise of such an action is what then, in turn, gives the 
political coordinates within a specific state their predetermined character as it were. The state 
and its accompanying laws are retroactively legitimated, as if by necessity, as the way things 
“have to be”. 
 What Foucault isolates within this sovereign logic, or logic of sovereignty, is             
a “philosophical” law of “necessity”, one that rightly mirrors certain historical theological 
legitimations for God’s necessary existence, but which also serves to obfuscate the lack of any 
true justification for the right of the sovereign to rule. It is this “mystical” foundation, as 
theorists from Pierre Bourdieu to Jacques Derrida have termed it, that underlies all normative 
legal measures within a state’s provenance (Bourdieu 1991; Derrida 2002). In Foucault’s 
survey of the literature written in defense of such a state, we can see the necessity for the 
state’s existence trumping the rule of law, which is also inextricably bound up with the state’s 
existence: 
There is then a necessity that is over and above the law. Or rather, the law of this 
reason peculiar to the state, and which is called raison d’État, is that the state’s salvation 
must prevail over any other law. This fundamental law of necessity, which at bottom 
is not a law, thus goes beyond all natural law, positive law, and even the law of God’s 
commandments, which the theorists dare not call exactly divine law, but call instead 
“philosophical”, so as to mask things a little (Foucault 2007, 262–263). 
Existing in such a manner, the state rests upon its own right to exist, that which truly has no 
foundation, a genuinely immanent moment of self-creation, if you will. Above every legal 
norm, it is the existence of the state itself that must be preserved at all costs, even if that 
means reinforcing the state’s existence in extra-judicial instances. As Schmitt had already 
made clear, it is precisely the sovereign’s ability to declare a “state of exception” to the rule of 
law that defines the sovereign’s power (Schmitt 2005, 5). 
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 As Foucault will later discern, the world is governed according to an “economy of 
salvation” that seeks in some sense only to preserve itself (Foucault 2007, 235)2. Any violent 
action that is taken as a “pastoral” measure in order to ensure the survival of the state – 
something he explicitly links to a rise in Christian discourse concerning the “governing” or 
“shepherding” of souls in Christendom – is one carried out in the interests of saving the 
state. Political necessity exercised through often violent means thereby becomes inseparably 
linked to pastoral methods of exclusion for the greater “health” of the whole.  
The usual, habitual exercise of raison d’État is not violent precisely because it readily 
avails itself of laws as its framework and form. But when necessity demands it, raison 
d’État becomes coup d’État, and then it is violent. This means that it is obliged to 
sacrifice, to sever, cause harm, and it is led to be unjust and murderous. As you know, 
this principle is completely at variance with the pastoral theme that the salvation of 
each is the salvation of all, and the salvation of all is the salvation of each. We now 
have a raison d’État for which the pastoral will be one of selection and exclusion, of the 
sacrifice of some for the whole, of some for the state (Foucault 2007, 263). 
The performance, or theater, of the state, as he will put it, is one played out against the 
backdrop of a rigorously formed, Christian conceptualization of pastoral power, one that is 
mobilized theoretically on behalf of the state in order to maintain the “peace” or normative 
adherence to law that comes after one accepts its necessity, much as believers had accepted 
God’s law as the inevitable condition of their right to life. Citizens of the state, much like 
believers who undergo ascetic practices in order to deepen their faith, are therefore willing to 
endure – and indeed in some sense themselves to bring about – a certain level of violence    
to the social body so that the state might survive. This constitutes its own peculiar, 
secularized form of salvation, a formulation that signals the state’s implicit theological origins 
(Foucault 2007, 266–267). 
 What Foucault “uncovers” in this genealogy of the state in the Western world         
is a consistent and underlying dialectic between obedience and sedition – the latter arising 
from a general state of discontent, the former from a certain acceptance of the state’s right to 
exist – that mirrors, with great precision, the dialectic found within ecclesial structures set up 
antagonistically between the orthodox and the heretical. His contention is that the dialectic, 
no matter what location it is found in, is actually internal to a state, or Church for that matter, 
that cannot ultimately justify its reason for existence, its raison d’État. As such, he will 
conclude that “[…] sedition should not be seen as extraordinary so much as an entirely 
                                               
2  Foucault’s formulation of  an “economy of  salvation” that seeks only to preserve itself  can be discerned 
at work in Agamben’s articulation of  such a theological economy in relation to the political governance of  our 
world; see Agamben 2011, 47. 
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normal, natural phenomenon, immanent as it were to the life of the res publica, of the 
republic”, though it is more likely to be treated as anything but a part of its normative identity 
(Foucault 2007, 267). In most instances, the legitimacy of the sovereign rests upon its ability 
to act, again, “decisively” against any such mobilized moments of sedition, revolt, “heresy”, 
antinomianism or the like. There is no doubt that such “seditious” movements are often 
“bad” for the general health and welfare of the state, but it is also the case, as Foucault makes 
clear – and as Agamben will later second with renewed force – that these movements arise 
from within the rule of sovereign power and not as an external threat to its rule.  
 This tension is likewise played out within the Church, and, as Foucault spends a fair 
amount of time exploring, between the pastorate which “shepherds” the flock, and its 
mystical elements which promise an immediate communion with the presence of God 
(Foucault 2007, 213). This tension between the pastoral and the mystical is the ongoing 
dialectic that will place mysticism and a variety of movements inspired by the Holy Spirit 
under intense scrutiny throughout the Middle Ages, and even, one might wager, up to this 
very day3. Such movements were certainly active throughout the Reformation, a situation 
captured quite succinctly in his estimation that such movements include “[…] a particle, a 
fragment, a spark of the Holy Spirit in each of the faithful and so they will no longer need      
a shepherd” (Foucault 2007, 214)4. It is this framework for tensions within the Church which 
will play itself out on occasion in the domain of scriptural interpretation – who has access to 
it, who has the right or authority to interpret it – and which will become heightened 
throughout the Reformation as a tension between competing ecclesial authorities. 
 Throughout his assessment, however, Foucault will make clear that the organization 
of the pastorate, and its accompanying power, lies fundamentally at the heart of Christianity: 
“[…] Christianity in its real pastoral organization is not an ascetic religion, it is not a religion 
of the community, it is not a mystical religion, it is not a religion of Scripture, and, of course, 
it is not an eschatological religion” (Foucault 2007, 214). Each of these “anti-pastoral” tactics 
(or forms of “counter-conduct”), as Foucault labels them, which are also somehow a part of 
the Christian tradition – although this dual identity is not clearly sketched out in detail – are 
actually “border-elements” established as counter-practices to the pastoral core of 
Christianity: that which, he will claim, establishes the foundations of modern 
governmentality. To what degree they are not simply “border-elements” but actually 
                                               
3  See the analysis given to the role of  the Holy Spirit in ecclesial reform in Congar 2011. The Franciscan 
order, which will prove exemplary to Agamben, was likewise subjected to numerous tests in order to discern 
whether it fell under the heading of  any seditious “Holy Spirit” movement that threatened the established, 
hierarchical order of  the Catholic Church at the time of  the order’s founding. 
4  The search for an inner truth (confession) that resides in tension with a more lasting and final 
illumination (mysticism) is what will eventually prompt, in Foucault’s estimation, the separation of  confession 
from faith; see Foucault 2014, 134. 
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constituent of the Christian tradition, however, is not a topic that Foucault will discuss at 
length in this context, although it is a point I want to return to in a moment when I will 
briefly take up Giorgio Agamben’s implicit expansion (and subtle critique) of Foucault on 
just this point. 
 What Foucault does pick up and develop, and in great depth as it will underpin        
a good deal of his analysis throughout his later lectures at the Collège de France, is how his 
genealogy of pastoral power lays the foundations for the birth of the state as it is “situated 
within a more general history of governmentality”, which also evolved to combat any form of 
disorder within its “system” (Foucault 2007, 247, 196). Again, re-affirming the initial 
connection made between God and the sovereign, Foucault measures out the relationship 
not only between these two crucial figures, but also between pastoral power and 
governmentality. To do so, first, he establishes the nature of sovereign logic in relation to its 
theological foundations, but also its distance from the actual pastorate: “[…] God does not 
‘govern’ the world; he does not govern it in the pastoral sense. He reigns over the world in    
a sovereign manner through principles” (Foucault 2007, 235). The imagined close proximity 
of the divine to our world – a foundational principle of many traditional western religious 
worldviews – is revealed as a completely mistaken proposition in terms of how the 
omnipotence of God is actually perceived. God, as the ultimate transcendent sovereign, 
reigns over our world from a great distance, one that cannot be easily bridged, at least not by 
traditional theological accounts. Once this revelation of God’s distance is critically 
introduced, it is only a short step toward the establishment of another way of perceiving God 
through the role of Jesus Christ, the shepherd who governs the flocks, the one who 
reintroduces the pastoral paradigm, for, in Foucault’s words, “[t]he Western sovereign is 
Caesar, not Christ; the Western pastor is not Caesar, but Christ” (Foucault 2007, 156). 
 Foucault’s essential development here is that it is the series of everyday, bureaucratic 
practices he terms “governmentality”, rather than the sovereign’s exercise of ruling power, as 
in the case of a monarch, for example, that generates the daily activity of the state and 
therefore is an essential component of the state’s identity. As such, it does not come to exist 
as a self-legitimating construct, like the sovereign who rules solely through claiming the right 
to rule as it were, but rather is formed through what Foucault calls a relation of self to self 
(Foucault 2005, 252) – that is of the “apparatus (dispositif) of subjectivity” which aligns the 
“subject’s knowledge (connaissance) of himself and of the subject’s obedience to the law” 
(Foucault 2005, 319). Governmentality is thereby concerned with the formation of 
subjectivity, the relating of self to self through everyday life, within the boundaries of a given 
state. It is precisely then the construction of subjects in relation to law which becomes 
manifest for Foucault in the exercise of pastoral (and ecclesial) power through certain 
disciplinary apparatuses that come to shape the Western subject as we know it, from 
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confession to the examination of conscience, and from certain meditative practices to 
spiritual direction, among others (Foucault 2014, 266)5. It is in this way that, in his lectures 
from 1974–1975, he will link the practice of confession, for example, to the social regulation 
of the “abnormal” (Foucault 2003, 169). In terms of governmentality, these religious 
practices will soon give way in the modern period to more “secularized” practices of selves 
relating to selves, such as through police interrogation, prisons, medical and psychological 
practices and so forth – analyzed themes that would come to dominate his published 
genealogical studies. 
 In his lectures On the Government of the Living two years later, from 1979–1980, 
Foucault continues to expound upon these connections, but also to deepen the scope of his 
analysis in pursuit of the link “[…] between the government of men, the manifestation of the 
truth in the form of subjectivity, and the salvation of each and all” (Foucault 2014, 75). In his 
genealogical examination, he privileges the “truth act itself” rather than the beliefs or dogmas 
of the believers (Foucault 2014, 83), and turns to the history of the practice of confession, or 
the revelation of a truth deep within oneself that one is not even fully cognizant of, and 
which is the basis of many other Christian practices, such as baptism, that also serve to reveal 
the hidden “mysteries of the heart” found within believers (Foucault 2014, 103, 106). Acts 
such as confession become the basic practices that strive to assist the believer in “becoming 
the truth”, or that which becomes the condition of subjectivity: “[…] avowal and faith come 
together again in [a type] of truth act in which adherence to the dogmatic content has the 
same form as the relation of self to self in subjectivity exploring itself” (Foucault 2014, 85). 
The establishment of the subject, whether in religious or political terms, becomes effective 
through such practices of confession as are aimed at bringing the subject into existence. 
 Despite this arrival of the self at the truth it seeks to become through such everyday 
practices, there remains yet, for Foucault, a fundamental anxiety about whether or not one 
has actually achieved this state of “salvation”, a precarious identification that keeps            
one uneasily within the domain of pastoral influence. In his words, “[i]f one wants to have 
faith, one must never be certain about what one is oneself” (Foucault 2014, 127). This 
fundamental anxiety, in turn, gives rise directly to a Protestant, even Calvinist, formulation of 
the self that continuously strives to find guarantees of its anticipated salvation. As Foucault 
notes, this baseline of anxiety and insecurity historically brings about a new form of fear that 
coincides, in a sense, with the rise of the modern nation-state, or that which appeared to offer 
humanity more security than religion was capable of providing in material terms6. It is in this 
                                               
5  See also Foucault 2003, 175–180, and Carrette 2000. 
6  It would be interesting in this regard to read the establishment of  the Treaty of  Westphalia (1648), 
which defined “internal” political boundaries within the Western world, and which recognized Calvinism as      
a legitimate tradition, as mirroring this struggle for “self ” identity that Foucault isolates in this context. 
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later formulation of a justification for state apparatuses that we will see subjects formed 
through a fundamental anxious wish for security to be granted by the state, a parallel, 
incessant but also always incomplete motion toward alleviating one’s anxiety for a salvation 
that can never truly be attained during one’s lifetime. His reading too, from this point of 
view, is a significant piece of political theology in that it reveals how the modern turn from 
religion to the nation-state, and so from theology to politics, is one that yet maintains the 
same religious practices for the formation of political, “secularized” subjects. 
 In this overlap between the exercises of both pastoral power and state governance, 
there is also a specific dispossession of the self that is symbolically captured by the Christian 
call to embrace the death of one’s self, or the “mortification” of the self, but which is also, as 
Foucault rightly identifies, what lies at the heart of early Christian rites of exorcism (Foucault 
2014, 151). What is actually encountered in such rites, which essentially posit that a soul is 
“possessed” by another spirit, one wholly foreign to it, is the presence of an “otherness” 
within the self. Both exorcism and the state’s conditioning of the subject are as such “[…] 
thought on the basis of the problem of the other, of the other as that which has seized power 
in us” (Foucault 2014, 160). It is this otherness at the core of the believer that, in turn, 
actually motivates one’s acceptance of the presence of God (or the sovereign who rules the 
land): “What one knows is God or the divine in oneself, or what enables you to know        
the divine itself” (Foucault 2014, 254). In this fashion, the self in whom God resides as          
a form of otherness and, in parallel, the sovereign who does likewise for the citizen are 
cemented as identical formulations, and in such a way as to guarantee the obedience of the 
“masses” as it were. 
 Foucault’s creative, if somewhat one-sided, reading of Christian adherence to an 
“economy of salvation” outside the confines of the law – a basic reading that has sustained 
not only centuries of opposition to Judaic Law and even anti-Semitism, but also its emphasis 
on a grace or mercy beyond all law – is what will lead him to the “standard” (mis)reading of 
Christian supersessionism:  
It is in this opposition between the Old Testament as book of the law and the New 
Testament as book of salvation that a whole line of Christian thought developed, of 
which Saint Paul, of course, was the first representative to whom one always referred 
afterwards, a line internal to Christianity for making Christianity a religion not of the 
law, but of salvation (Foucault 2014, 183–184). 
Foucault acknowledges that such a stance outside the law can lead to Christian claims being 
taken to the extremes of both asceticism and antinomianism, but also that such stances 
inherently flow outward from this basic position taken with regard to the Law. The dynamic 
tension between normativity (law) and a push to go beyond such measures (something like 
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“grace”) would seem to be entirely constitutive of Christian identity, with any possible danger 
to the status quo and revolutionary tendencies both included. 
 What he is more concerned with at the moment, however, is not a re-reading of 
Christianity that would call into question such a rigid division between the law and grace, 
which has been the general direction of theology over the last half-century or so, but rather to 
utilize this perceived division in order to isolate and mobilize the “truth” of the dispossessed 
subject who lives under a certain pastoral power exercised in the modern (secular) world as    
a form of governmentality. What was effectively developed in a post-Reformation, Western 
context was a subject “freed from its own truth” precisely through its subjection to a logic of 
governmentality (Foucault 2014, 227). This “manifestation of the truth” that “de-identified” 
the subject ended up being the very logic by which the “self” was transformed into a citizen-
subject (Foucault 2014, 226). 
 These various strands of interlocked thought will coalesce in his The Hermeneutics of 
the Subject, the title of his lectures from 1981–1982, on the examination of conscience and the 
care of self. In general, Foucault seems here to be setting up an alternative to the “economy 
of salvation” that functions within the domain of pastoral power. In its stead, salvation is 
rather re-presented as a personal measure utilized in order to save oneself alone, something 
he finds active within ancient philosophical practices that ran counter to later Christianized 
ones. Hence, in this context, he inspects monastic traditions in relation to ancient 
philosophical schools of thought, rather than perceiving monastic life itself as a counter-
measure to pastoral power. As such, he is able to draw up his own counter-force to pastoral 
power, that which is located in the ancient, Greek care of the self and the courage to truth 
(parrhēsia), a major concept within Foucault’s later work. 
 He begins this re-defining of salvation by first re-contextualizing it vis-à-vis Greek 
traditions: “Salvation is a completely traditional term. You find it in fact in Plato, where it is 
associated with the problem of care of the self and care of others. One must be saved, one 
must save oneself, in order to save others” (Foucault 2005, 180). In the Christian tradition, 
which Foucault takes up in this context specifically in order to provide a foil to ancient 
philosophical uses of the term, salvation becomes a complex event that sometimes involves 
one saving oneself, in a sense, or, more directly, being saved by someone else (i.e. Jesus 
Christ, God, etc.). The sense of the terms that Foucault is seeking to recover from their 
Greek usage, however, is one wherein salvation is  
[…] an activity, the subject’s constant action on himself, which finds its reward in       
a certain relationship of the subject to himself when he has become inaccessible to 
external disorders and finds a satisfaction in himself, needing nothing but himself. In    
a word, let’s say that salvation is the vigilant, continuous, and completed form of the 
relationship to self closed in on itself (Foucault 2005, 184–185).  
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What he discovers is a form of Hellenistic and Roman salvation in which “[o]ne saves oneself 
for the self, one is saved by the self, one saves oneself in order to arrive at nothing other than 
oneself” (Foucault 2005, 185). The “otherness” that had so permeated the self, and which 
had to be, at times, exorcised from the self in a religious rite of dis-possession, is no longer 
the primary way of defining the self. Moreover, in this formulation of things, there is no 
“binary” system of dividing the self at all, understood as an act of self-renunciation, within 
this ancient scheme of relations (Foucault 2005, 185). 
 The error, according to this ancient line of inquiry on caring for the self, is not, 
following Christianity, to fail to renounce the self, but simply to forget to care about oneself 
in order to care, first and foremost, for someone else above one’s own self (Foucault 2005, 
198). Paying attention to otherness, from this angle, is the problem for Foucault above all else. 
This, he is suggesting, is the “error” that Christianity seems to fall into, with its apparent death 
of the self and through its call to love others ‘more than’ one’s own life. As he will render it, 
“[a] fundamental element of Christian conversion is renunciation of oneself, dying to oneself, 
and being reborn in a different self and a new form which, as it were, no longer has anything 
to do with the earlier self in its being, its mode of being, in its habits or its ēthos” (Foucault 
2005, 211; see also 250). It is in fact a “dying to death” in order to be reborn (Foucault 2014, 
214). In the ancient line of thought he is pursuing, and in opposition to the Christian “death 
to the self”, there is no radical discontinuity with the self, as one is turning directly toward this 
self, the final “goal” toward which one is advancing.  
 Ancient ascetic practices within certain philosophical schools of thought – early 
forerunners of Christian monasticism, a counter-practice he does not fully take up directly7 – 
were not geared toward the renunciation of the self, but invested in a “return to the self” that 
sought to bind one to the truth as it were. This is not a form of conversion understood in       
a later Christian sense as metanoia, or a conversion based on repentance, but rather, following 
Pierre Hadot’s work, an awakening to the self (epistrophē) and an embracing of the self 
(Foucault 2005, 215). Foucault’s later remarks on a form of speaking the truth, parrhēsia, will 
be bound up with this subject who seeks to express the self in as fully a manner as possible 
(Foucault 2014, 130–131)8. In his words, “[w]hat authenticates the fact that I tell you the 
truth is that as subject of my conduct I really am, absolutely, integrally, and totally identical to 
the subject of enunciation I am wherein I tell you what I tell you. Here, I think, we are at the 
heart of parrhēsia” (Foucault 2005, 407). 
 Christianity, as opposed to ancient Greek practices of parrhēsia, will propose to 
transfer such courageous truth-telling onto God and not onto human beings. As Foucault 
                                               
7  See his comments on monasticism, in Foucault 2014, 195, 258–264. 
8  See also Foucault 2011. 
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will elaborate in his last lectures from 1983–1984, for humanity, there will be only                  
a fundamental mistrust of the self in relation to God, one that leads to a form of obedience 
to God as the only way to access such truth-telling (Foucault 2011, 334). To be sure, 
Christianity would eventually, even “paradoxically” as Foucault renders it, take up some 
forms of ancient practice aimed at knowing the self, such as the examination of conscience, 
but it did so by grafting something “foreign” onto itself (Foucault 2005, 422–424)9. What the 
ancient Greek philosophical schools he examines were after was a forma vitae, or “form of 
life” that lives beyond the rules of society, entrusting its members to a radical care of the self 
(Foucault 2005, 424). 
 Perhaps one could make an argument that there is little difference between the 
ancient model’s stress upon how the care of the self “becomes coextensive with life” 
(Foucault 2005, 86) and those many Christians who have historically made their faith likewise 
“coextensive with life”, one which Jesus himself proclaims to be the “way, truth and the 
life”10. Yet there would still remain a crucial difference that Foucault himself notes, for        
the Christian sense of the fullness of life has often been rooted in a life beyond this life, a clear 
distinction from the ancient Greek conceptualization: “[…] in Christian asceticism there is of 
course a relation to the other world (l’autre monde), and not to the world which is other” 
(Foucault 2011, 319). 
 Though it is perhaps not as clear how or why the Christian “rebirth” of the self 
differs so dramatically from an ancient model of caring for the self which also recognized that 
the self was to “become again what we never were”, or, more precisely, “become again what 
we should have been but never were” (Foucault 2005, 95), Foucault’s quest to seek after        
a “form of life” lived outside the law does bear a certain similarity to the Christian quest to 
search for a similar “form of life”. It is Foucault’s insistence on an alternative path which is 
mirrored rather precisely by permanent tensions within certain Christian monastic and 
religious orders throughout the centuries – a point that Giorgio Agamben has taken up 
directly in his study of monastic and Franciscan practices and principles, which I will explore 
in a moment. As I now intend to demonstrate, Foucault’s perhaps overstated claim that 
Christianity divorces knowledge of God from knowledge of the self likewise seems to step 
beyond what many theologians would consider to be the domain of Christian practices of the 
self (Foucault 2014, 310). 
                                               
9  See also his remarks on the role of  “examination” in general, and insofar as it is explicitly linked to his 
commentary on pastoral power here, in Foucault 1977, 184–194. 
10  See John 14.6. 
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In her Torture and Truth, Page duBois takes up a line of inquiry that in many ways runs parallel 
to Foucault’s, especially in that she seeks to discern the manner in which truth is “extracted” 
from the bodies of those who supposedly “know” it, which can be an often violent, even 
torturous affair. This is a resonance we can still hear echoing in the word “confession”, which 
certainly has connotations in the world of police and military affairs no less than in the 
Church (duBois 1991). Any difference between these two worlds, however, lies in the way in 
which the religious confession still holds something in reserve, as Karmen MacKendrick has 
put it in a theological paradigm, something that cannot be fully disclosed and which perhaps 
seduces us still further toward and into its mystery (MacKendrick 2013, 50–51).  
 What I want to briefly argue is that, despite his rigorous genealogy of the modern 
subject, Foucault yet fails to take up a certain significant and alternative methodological 
consideration in his genealogy of the self, one that might alternatively posit how Christianity 
contains within itself a sort of “negative dialectic” that exceeds the standard juxtaposition of 
the pastoral against the mystical, or even the orthodox against the heretical. That is: perhaps 
the Christian subject does not fully manifest the truth hidden or concealed within it, but 
retains something of a mystery beyond itself, which constantly and consistently undoes the 
subject. To gain a glimpse of how one might work with, but also beyond, Foucault, we might 
turn to the writings of Giorgio Agamben who gives us such an account and, to do so, has 
adapted Foucault’s insights within a specific Christian (Pauline) formulation of the self. 
 What is most obvious about Agamben’s incorporation of Foucaultian insight can be 
gleaned quite readily from his genealogical study of an “economy of glory” that is framed by 
his analysis of the rise of Western governmentality, which he takes up explicitly in his The 
Kingdom and the Glory. Like Foucault, Agamben is concerned with halting the assimilation of     
a more fundamental human essence – humanity’s “pure potentiality” which is at times 
described as our essential tendency toward rendering the state’s apparatuses of subjectivity 
“inoperative” – rather than promoting a form of actuality in league with that which is 
“operative”. In his words, “[…] the governmental apparatus functions because it has 
captured in its empty center the inoperativity of the human essence”, an essence he is 
determined to liberate (Agamben 2011, 246). As such, Agamben isolates those religious 
traditions that in fact resisted inscription into the practices of governmentality, that have 
sought to liberate something like a human essence that is all-too-often contorted and 
inscribed into the apparatuses of governmentality. What Agamben seeks to do, however, is to 
find such resources within the Christian tradition rather than in ancient Greek traditions. 
 Though this empty space of inoperativity at the center of governmentality coincides 
with the inoperativity of the “messianic operation” which suspends normative measures like 
the rule of law (Agamben 2011, 249), it yet differs from it in that the suspension offered by 
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the messianic is assimilated within the economy of glory in order to legitimate the latter’s 
movement away from our pure potentiality and toward a form of actuality (or necessity, as 
Foucault had earlier called it), or, by definition then, the formation of government itself. 
Agamben elaborates on how governmentality sublimates the messianic suspension thus: “In 
accordance with an apparatus that has by now become familiar to us, a doctrine of glorious 
life that isolates eternal life and its inoperativity in a separate sphere comes to substitute that 
of the messianic life. Life, which rendered all forms inoperative, itself becomes a form in 
glory” (Agamben 2011, 249). The “formlessness” of the messianic, or life itself, in all its 
myriad existence, is given “concrete” (representative) form through the apparatuses that in 
effect give shape to “whatever being”, as he will suggest in one context (Agamben 1993); they 
construct the “human being” itself, as he will take up the idea in another (Agamben 2004). 
Agamben’s entire corpus of work, it would seem, is geared toward dismantling such 
representations and offering to us an alternative, albeit vague (“whatever”), “originary” being, 
exposed to the world in its nudity. Indeed, there is a complex rethinking of the subject that 
issues forth from Agamben’s work, one that pivots on a reconceptualization of the subject 
who is rendered “inoperative”, but thereby more authentically itself: “[…] it is only through 
the contemplation of power, which renders all specific energeia inoperative, that something 
like an experience of one’s ‘own’ and a ‘self’ becomes possible. ‘Self’, subjectivity, is what 
opens itself as a central inoperativity in every operation, like the live-ability of every life” 
(Agamben 2011, 251). Though this may be a highly paradoxical formulation, it is the path 
toward our truest selves – our “whatever” being – that Agamben resolutely steers us toward. 
 As if recognizing Foucault’s earlier elaboration on the “apparatuses of subjectivity” 
in the Western governmental construction of the self, Agamben will nonetheless push past 
the point where Foucault left off, intending to arrive at a new understanding of the self that 
seeks to escape from its indebtedness to the machinery (“apparatuses”) of Western 
governmentality and theological (pastoral) power, for, as he too recognizes, “[…] from the 
perspective of theological oikonomia […] nothing is more urgent than to incorporate 
inoperativity within its own apparatuses” (Agamben 2011, 251). It is in response to this 
“urgent” task which he wishes to see brought to a standstill that Agamben counter-proposes 
another one: rendering such apparatuses themselves inoperative through a “messianic” 
suspension of their economy. In suggesting this, he points toward something like poetry, 
which manages, entirely within the coordinates of language, to suspend the normal economy 
of language, its “economic and biological operations” and to point through this suspension 
toward a “new, possible use” of language for the human being (Agamben 2011, 252). 
 We should recognize in this formulation of calling a halt to the operations of the 
governmental apparatus something like another reading of the Christian subject, one that takes 
up something akin to the monastic “form-of-life” (forma vitae) that Foucault was likewise after, 
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but which also is to be distinguished from the pastorally constituted Christian subject. 
Envisioning this “new” form of subjectivity beyond what we have hitherto known takes the 
trajectory, for Agamben – and here the contrast with Foucault’s reading of Paul as the one 
who focused more on salvation than on the law is striking – of something like a Pauline death 
to the self that is also a death to such standard dialectical, representative formulations11. This 
is precisely what Agamben will take up in his reading of Saint Paul on one’s (non)identity 
conceived through the “division of division itself”, which to his mind constitutes an entirely 
different approach to understanding the formation of the Western Christian subject 
(Agamben 2005). Such a reading converges exactly, moreover, with the theologian Jürgen 
Moltmann’s attempt to isolate the nucleus of Christian identity as the “negation of negation”, 
something he takes up following both Hegel and Theodor Adorno’s development of             
a “negative dialectics” (Moltmann 1993, 254; Adorno 1973). What both thinkers propose        
is a movement beyond the historical tensions Foucault identifies, and the alleged favoring of 
grace over law, but also a step backward, closer to the Pauline proclamation that all identities, 
all social divisions as it were, were themselves subject to another division, one into spirit and 
flesh, that served to undermine any strong representational claims12. 
 In seeing this movement of non-identity as it were, we might notice as well how the 
fundamental anxiety that Foucault identified as constitutive of Christian identity is actually 
dispelled by the self that recognizes its own fractured identity, and does this as the means by 
which it is “saved” so to speak. This movement toward a poverty of the self is not anxious 
about whether it has achieved something permanent, but rather is “helped” by the knowledge 
that it is not a permanent, monolithic self. And this is perceived to be the case not in another 
world, either yet to come or permanently “elsewhere”, but firmly within this world – a work of 
“absolute immanence” that characterizes Agamben’s work from its inception (Agamben 
2000). 
 Beyond this implicit critique and refinement of Foucault’s position, Agamben, for 
his part, seems to have in some sense defied Foucault’s criticisms of Christianity by taking up 
the history of monasticism, and more precisely, the Franciscans, in order to demonstrate how it 
has been at times the most prominent attempt to establish a “form-of-life” lived beyond the 
confines of both the Church and society, beyond the “laws” of both. In his The Highest 
Poverty: Monastic Rules and Form-of-Life, for example, Agamben takes up the history of monastic 
rule and of the Franciscan relationship to possession and use in order to establish a “form-of-
life” potentially lived outside the law, that which seeks access to the “thing itself” as the 
person or presence standing before us. His short study of the permanent tensions between 
                                               
11  See, e.g., Romans 6. 
12  See Romans 7–8 and Galatians 3.28, among others, as well as Agamben’s commentary on this division 
(Agamben 2005, 49). 
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life and liturgy in these  early Christian communities yields the Franciscan “solution” to this 
problematic equating of life and rule: the “highest poverty”, or an attempt to live 
“extraneous” to the law – making use of something while not actually possessing it 
(Agamben 2013, 122). What results from such a reinterpretation of Christian life (rather than 
doctrine) is that, in Agamben’s words, 
[…] [t]he specific eschatological character of the Franciscan message is not expressed 
in a new doctrine, but in a form of life through which the very life of Christ is made 
newly present in the world to bring to completion, not the historical meaning of the 
“person” in the economy of salvation, so much as his life as such (Agamben 2013, 
143).  
It is only as such that the Franciscans are able to step “outside” the Church while yet 
remaining fully within it. This is, moreover, another way to present us with the “messianic” 
life, which is really just life itself and therefore “absolutely” immanent: that which we have 
such trouble recognizing in its precarious vulnerability, much like the nudity of our own 
bodies that we seek to clothe and hide, though our bodies nonetheless still do exist and 
persist underneath their many-layered veils (Agamben 2010). 
 The “ontology of poverty” that Agamben unfolds through his analysis of the 
Franciscan ideal, I would argue, becomes that which “undoes” the standard reading             
of the Christian subject as one bound up and complicit with pastoral power: he identifies       
a “more fundamental” essence of the Christian self that would be more in line with 
Foucault’s “counter practices” of the Christian self. What Agamben seeks to usher in is no 
less than a death to the modern “self” which was conceived on the basis of the Western 
paradigm of governmentality (again in agreement with Foucault). There is a poverty of the 
self that he detects at work in Franciscan thought and it is one that seems to be a more 
authentic bearer of the messianic principle at the heart of the Christian narrative. In this 
counter-proposition to the governmental manufacturing of selves, the Pauline “division” of 
the subject becomes a pouring out, or poverty, of the self that brings about, not just the death 
of the subject, but a political challenge to all political subjects: “The ‘highest poverty’, with its 
use of things, is the form-of-life that begins when all the West’s forms of life have reached 
their historical consummation” (Agamben 2013, 143). Hence he can suggest, in the end, that 
“[t]he Franciscan form of life is, in this sense, the end of all lives (finis omnium vitarum)” as we 
have consistently represented life in the West (Agamben 2013, 143). To suggest as much is 
certainly not to suggest that human “life” comes to an end – the various “apocalyptic” 
scenarios that some of Agamben’s critics might have felt he was moving closer toward – but 
rather to point toward an end to the ways in which we have represented human life, and 
opening us up to new senses of being human than we have perhaps ever conceived. 
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 As Paul himself once conjectured, in the death one dies with the Messiah (whom he 
took to be the historical person of Jesus Christ), there is yet another life possible, though one 
that may appear as the opposite of the reality that an individual had previously known and 
lived out. What Agamben seems to be telling us is that this manifest proclamation may not 
have been entirely forgotten after Paul’s death, but may have survived in various “forms-of-
life” lived in faithfulness to this particular messianic suspension of (human, religious, political, 
economic, or just all) identity as we had known it. Such “forms-of-life” in fact may have been 
thriving around us all along, unnoticed but crying out for a radically different access to the 
vital life we all were already always living. Though Agamben’s recent research has only 
pointed toward a series of somewhat marginalized Christian traditions and practices as 
countermeasures to the Church’s more dominant hegemonic narrative, rather than offering 
us a fuller scale along which to revise the methods of theological inquiry itself, there is yet 
enough critical and historical interpretation on offer in his claims to present a bold re-
envisioning of political theology as a whole, one very much in need of further elaboration. 
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TYTUŁ: Z którą teologią polityczną mamy do czynienia? Oceniając genealogię teologii 
politycznej i wypatrując jej przyszłości 
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ABSTRAKT: W niniejszym tekście przyglądam się dostrzeżonemu przez Michela Foucaulta 
przeciwieństwu między teologicznymi obszarami władzy pastoralnej oraz mistycznej, by 
wskazać na nacisk, jaki filozof kładł na konieczność i opatrzność jako pojęcia założycielskie   
i legitymizujące Państwo. Dzięki temu rozwijam analizę tego, jak Foucault, krytykując 
historyczne wykorzystania teologii w roli narzędzia władzy pastoralnej, faktycznie wskazuje 
na rodzaj teologii politycznej odmiennej od tej stworzonej przez Carla Schmitta. Twierdzę, że 
zaczynamy zauważać odmienny „typ” teologii politycznej w pismach Giorgia Agambena, 
który podąża za tradycjami chrześcijańskimi znacznie bardziej niż Foucault. Moim zdaniem 
przeformułowanie teologii politycznej w dziele Agambena ma kolosalne znaczenie dla całego 
pola badawczego jako całości i pilnie domaga się dalszego opracowania, na co niniejszy esej 
zaledwie wskazuje. 
SŁOWA KLUCZOWE: Michel Foucault, Giorgio Agamben, rządomyślność, władza 
pastoralna, mistycyzm 
 
